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This paper reviews the problem of federalism and welfare and presents
statistical data about the relative welfare practices among the states
over the last 25 years. The relevance of these problems and practices
to the current hopes for welfare reform and policy conflicts within
Congress are discussed.
The political history of welfare reform efforts has involved
two interrelated themes. The first has to do with the implicit
assumptions about the fundamental causes of poverty and hence
the proper course and realistic capacity of government(s) to ef-
fectively reduce its magnitude. The second has to do with the
beliefs about the relative roles of each level of government and
the best patterns of intergovernmental co-operation in our fed-
eral system.1 Most observers agree that to achieve the elusive
goal of welfare reform, accommodation and compromise on both
themes will be required. Forty-five years ago Lady Rhys-Wil-
liams addressing the first theme, spoke of work incentives as "The
lion in the path of curing want by . . . [public policy] . . ."
(Green, 1966, p. 52) If, as it is sometimes suggested, we are close
to achieving a consensus on that issue, it may be that we will
find that the new "lion in the path" of welfare reform is
federalism.
In the political debate the definition of specific roles for each
level of government in welfare policy is as important as the
debate over the roles of government in general. In federal poli-
tics, which government should act is as important as what gov-
ernment should do. Though federalism issues have seldom held
center stage, the beliefs held about federalism have fundamen-
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tally shaped the structure of the debate and defined the policy
options that have been perceived as available at nearly every
significant juncture in the evolution of American welfare policy
(Heffernan, in press).
The first part of this paper reviews the problem of federalism
and welfare. The argument that state and local governments can
more effectively assess their own needs and therefore should
have greater flexibility to address all aspects of welfare policy
stands in juxtaposition to the belief that welfare is a national
problem and requires a nationally uniform response. Between
the two beliefs there are some fundamentally important prop-
ositions about both welfare and of federalism that have not been
sufficiently examined.
Section two presents statistical data about the relative wel-
fare practices among the states over the last 25 years. That the
American states have been diverse in their public assistance pro-
grams is well documented. It is also recognized that the states
move slowly and often at odds to national incentive. The data
presented in section two show that despite rather considerable
variation in national/state compacts over the 25 years, and de-
spite dramatic shifts in each state's political economy, state wel-
fare spending and state welfare guarantees have not become
more adequate and/or uniform.
The final section comments on the relevance of these prob-
lems and practices to the current hopes for welfare reform and
the policy conflicts within Congress.
I The Politics of Federalism
The central political problems associated with shared re-
sponsibility for governance in a single geographic area have
dominated American domestic policy history. The conflicts be-
tween Federalist and Anti-Federalist structured the formation of
our constitution, and later threatened its adoption (Bowen, 1966).
A significant portion of our constitutional law has developed out
of the conflict over the division of responsibilities between the
central government and the states. The conflict generated, in part
at least, the War Between the States. It has given substantive
form to virtually all domestic policy debates. 2 One of the char-
acteristics of federalism is its aspiration to simultaneously gen-
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erate unity and diversity. One of the forms of federalism has as
its goal a desire to establish two sovereign governments with
integrated responsibilities in one geographic area (Elazar, 1987,
p. 64). Considering the significance of federalism issues in gen-
eral domestic policy, it is not surprising that they have played
a similar role in the welfare policy debate. Issues concerning the
proper role of each level of government in providing for indi-
vidual citizens' needs and the most appropriate pattern of in-
tergovernmental cooperation and responsibility go to the heart
of the design of a welfare system (Ault, 1981). It is very clear
that at each step in the development and evolution of the Social
Security Act structural issues of federalism shaped the debate
and the resulting policy (Heffernan, 1979; Patterson, 1969).
In the literature of federalism some distinctions have been
made in federal forms. In classical federalism, powers are con-
stitutionally divided between the central and the regional gov-
ernments. Though co-coordinated, each government in its sphere
is independent. In less formal terms, federalism refers to any
structure of intergovernmental power relationships. The federal
form is said to exist somewhere between a unitary state and a
confederation. The firsgis where all power is delegated from the
general government to lesser units and the lesser units of gov-
ernment may be modified and abolished at the will of the central
unit. Confederation is where the central government does not
directly act on the citizens and the "lesser" units are totally free
to withdraw from the confederation. Between a unitary govern-
ment and a formal confederacy there is much distance. Adjec-
tives abound which are supposed to describe the federal
relationships; most of them are used without precision. Terms
such as; dual federalism, co-operative federalism, layer-cake fed-
eralism, marble cake federalism usually serve a political rather
than an analytical function in some specific policy debate.
Critical Problems of Welfare and Federalism in the 1980's
There is no consensus between those who believe that the
national government should bear the additional costs of any
welfare reform and those who believe, along with President Re-
agan, that those costs ought to be assigned to state and local
units of government (Chisma and Pifer, 1987). Clearly the fear
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that one or another unit of government would be a fiscal loser
in any reorganization of welfare responsibilities has served to
scuttle previous reform efforts. The problem is however much
larger than that of shifting fiscal responsibility.
For the past two and one half decades there has been a per-
ception of ideological as well as political stalemate in welfare
policy. The shape of this conflict is well known to the readers
of this journal. On one side there has been a liberal paradigm,
which viewed poverty as caused by external events over which
those most affected had little or no control (Danziger and Wein-
berg, 1986). On the other side there is a conservative paradigm
which asserted that too much social welfare spending has not
only been a drag on economic growth; but, more importantly
has undermined the social and civic responsibilities of the needy.
The latter reflects the design failure of the programs now badly
in need of redirection. From the conservtive paradigm the pro-
grams were inadvertently structured so that persons and fami-
lies with income problems were actually induced to stay on
welfare, to avoid low paying start-up jobs, and/or to shirk basic
family responsibilities (Mead, 1986; Wilson, 1985). The liberal
paradigm responded that this was nonsense and that the ap-
parent connection between social programs and dependency was
only a mask for the real lack of an opportunity structure in a
capitalistic society (Harrington, 1984). It is now being suggested
by policy critics of diverse political views that both paradigms
were too naive. The new policy consensus suggests that the new
programs will have the following components: (a) an effective
integration of work and welfare programs, with work substi-
tuting for welfare whenever possible; (b) strengthened incen-
tives and regulations to enhance family responsibility; and (c) a
set of special designs of welfare programs structured to break
the poverty cycles of those who are locked into dysfunctional
life styles.
A new policy departure is now possible because liberals
recognize that an underclass exists and conservatives recognize
that the underclass was not created by the welfare system (Wil-
son, 1985). The assertion is frequently made that there is now
a bipartisan agreement that the AFDC program needs to be
radically reshaped into a work, schooling, training and reha-
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bilitation program with a cash transfer component rather than
a cash transfer program with each of these rehabilitative features
as cost-savings mechanisms. 3 In December of 1987 the full House
passed an amended version of the Family Welfare Reform Act of
1987. The amended version retained the emphasis on the NET-
Work (sic) as part of a Family Support Program. The House
passed version specifically deleted the national government's re-
quirement for a medical assistance transition which would have
required states to provide medicaid for at least 24 months to
those who lose cash aid because of earnings increase. The House
passed version also deleted the national government's appropri-
ation and requirement on the states to raise minimum benefit
levels to at least 15% of family median income. The CBO esti-
mate set the five year national government cost at $5.7 billion.
In April of 1988 the Senate Finance Committee began to
consider its own more modest reform package. The Senate ver-
sion places relatively more emphasis on child support collections
as a cost cutting mechanism. It does contain most of the edu-
cation, training and service programs, albeit under a different
name and at a lower cost. The House passed version and the
Senate version may now move closer to one another. The White
House is in opposition to even the $2.3 billion in additional
national cost of the Senate version and has threatened to veto
either form of legislation. The National Council of Human Ser-
vice Administrators appear to simultaneously want more federal
funding for minimum benefit levels and more state discretion
in the design and implementation of rehabilitative strategies
(American Public Welfare, Jan. 28, 1988).
A Return to the States
In a curious way the shift back to the states began with the
shift away from the states. President Johnson had made the wel-
fare system the centerpiece of his strategy of centralizing fed-
eralism (Butler and Kondratas, 1987). The failure of Presidents
Nixon, Ford and Carter to develop a national consensus on the
direction of welfare reform fueled the desire to "return" initiative
to the states.
During the 1970s debate over the direction of welfare reform
took place mainly in Congress. Nixon's Family Assistance Plan
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easily cleared the House of Representatives twice, but was twice
rejected in the Senate Finance Committee. The first rejection
was due to the fact that the national NWRO lobby and southern
conservative opposition at the state level both worked against
reform. The second rejection during the Nixon years resulted in
large part from the fact that general revenue sharing had un-
dermined the fiscal relief arguments for welfare reform. The
Carter administration was unable to develop a simultaneous
national policy for jobs and a national policy for income security.
While the Carter reform, PBIJ, did pass a special welfare reform
subcommittee, it faced stiff opposition in the full house and
failed to come to a vote (Lehman, 1980).
In December of 1980, after the election but before the in-
auguration, three men who wished to influence the future Pres-
ident debated welfare reform in the republican policy journal,
Common Sense. Richard Nathan, who had served as Deputy
Director of OMB under Nixon and who had been a principal in
the design of EA.P.; Paul O'Neil who had held a similar position
under Ford, and Robert Carlson who had served as Reagan's
Welfare Administrator in California and who was to serve briefly
as Special Assistant to the President for Human Resources de-
bated the role of the national government in federal welfare.
Nathan and O'Neil argued for a continued substantial national
role while Carlson made the case for a minimal national presence.
Presenting the classic case for domination by the national
government O'Neil said that, "the needy population is not uni-
formly distributed among the states. Second, the financial ca-
pacity to aid the needy is not distributed in relation to where
the needy live [and] third, the federal government provides such
a large share of the financial support of the existing programs
that it is difficult to see how it can ... extricate itself ... [with-
out massive disruptions in the system] . . . "(Common Sense,
1980, p. 27).
Taking a slightly different path which focused attention on
the same political history of reform efforts, Dick Nathan came
to the same conclusion "The idea of a block grant for AFDC
... [turns] .. .the clock back ... isolate[s] the most contro-
versial and vulnerable group of welfare recipients. It could result
in... higher concentrations of the poor in states with the most
adequate benefits .... The fact that people and jobs move in a
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free society is the underlying reason why the burden of financ-
ing welfare benefits should be shared on an equitable basis by
the society as a whole" (Common Sense, 1980, p. 10).
Carlson in his response did not address the federalism issue
directly but rather presented the classic case of the political dy-
namic of representative democracy and redistribution as seen
by the "fearful right": According to Carlson if the national role
was increased .. . irresistible pressures would build on Con-
gress to increase the centrally set benefit levels . . . More pres-
sures would then build from a greater number of constituents
for benefits until most Americans would be receiving benefits.
Eventually the nation's economic system would collapse (Com-
mon Sense, 1980, p. 15).
On January 26, 1982, President Reagan introduced his "New
Federalism" initiative. The centerpiece of the proposal was a
swap of welfare responsibilities. The states would assume Food
Stamps and AFDC and the national government would accept
fiscal and ultimately administrative responsibility for medicaid.
Interestingly, the transition was to be financed from a windfall
profits tax on excess profits from oil and other energy sources.
David Stockman presented the Administration's case to the
Senate Finance Committee. In so doing, he created a new ad-
jective for federalism. In Stockman's perspective we had moved
to "fragmented federalism." In his view the nation had shifted
from the traditional "dual federalism" where each government
had well-defined and separate responsibilities through a period
of "cooperative federalism" where a few specific functions were
shared to the current "fragmented federalism" where there is
decisional overload at the national level. He argued that mayors
and governors were not judged by their policies or their perfor-
mance at home but by their capacity to attract federal grant mon-
ies. He said that the system distorts judgments about both
political merits and the social needs for changes in social welfare
programs. Based on an undocumented set of assertions that the
states were now more equally able to act than they had been
even 20 years ago, Stockman summarized his argument as
follows:
Concern has been expressed about the willingness and the ability
of the states to take care of the disadvantaged . . . [within their
borders] .... On this point we should recognize that there are
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cliches and there are realities and one reality is that the same elec-
torate which chooses the President and Congressman also elects
Governors, Mayors and state legislators. There is no reason to be-
lieve that in the year 1982 the American people have two minds,
two hearts and two agendas regarding the responsibility of gov-
emnment to meet benign social needs. Every indication is that the
citizen participation at the state and local level on behalf of such
causes as the environment, ethnic and racial minorities, the dis-
advantaged, tax reform, the handicapped and electoral reform have
grown significantly in vigor and sophistication since the mid 1960s
(Stockman, 1982, p. 1).
The "swap" of federal and state responsibilities in welfare
failed to muster Congressional support (Howard, 1982, p. 9).
Part of the failure was due to falling oil profits which was to
have funded the transition. Also the individual states projected
that they would lose far more than the national governments
estimated. The proposal was quietly withdrawn by the admin-
istration. Despite its failure to achieve a dramatic reform, the
Reagan Administration has continued to move toward a devo-
lution of national welfare responsibilities (Peterson, 1984).
An examination of current legislative efforts to translate the
new realism into specific policy shows a call for greater state
initiative and less national government direction. New attention
is focused on the federalism issue by the recognition that the
poverty/welfare condition is far more intricate than either the
liberal or the conservative paradigm. Among the arguments pre-
sented, one is a very simple proposition; if programs need to be
uniquely tailored to the various classes of persons in need, do
they not also need to be uniquely tailored to the economic, social
and political conditions in each state as well? Along with a reas-
sessment of the policy thrust there has come, from various points
on the political spectrum, a call for a reassessment of the federal
system in welfare. The expected outcomes from that reassess-
ment are clearly not the same. The focus of the reassessment is
said to be on the issue of which governmental functions are
inherently national and which are inherently in the state/local
domain but require the use of the federal system and which lie
within the domain of state and local governments. In a rather
complex way, which cuts across traditional ideological and party
lines, there is a demand that there be a readjustment of func-
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tioning and financing to achieve a "proper" balance within the
federal system.
Although pro-state advocates have seized the initiative and
claimed the reform banner as their own, the nationalists have
by no means withdrawn from the field. On the one side there
is the position that the heavily marbled character of the current
programs (with two or more levels of government active to some
degree in nearly all aspects of the delivery of welfare programs)
is but a reflection of the realistic economic, social and political
integration of the American states. From this point of view it is
asserted that heavily conditioned and highly categorical pro-
grams are the only means available to achieve national welfare
objectives consistent with constitutional constraints (Wright,
1978). It is also argued that marbled federalism, Martin Groz-
den's famous term, is the only way to function if the aspirations
and requirements of regional minorities are to be achieved (Os-
burn, 1982). From a somewhat different perspective, it is some-
times suggested that full federal participation is required because
during regional or local economic recessions it is often counter-
productive to localized recovery for states to have to pick up
added welfare costs. The National Governor's Association 1987
position said that this problem is particularly frustrating since
regional recessions are often a function of national policy and
not correctable by state actions (National Governor's Associa-
tion, 1987).
The contrary view is that national domination of federal wel-
fare responsibilities produces rules which are "coercive," "bur-
densome," and "intrusive." It is also suggested that when activity
by each level of government is without clear legal and fiscal
accountability the result is a denial of a minimum level of either
political or administrative accountability (Stockman, 1982). The
desire for a more limited federal role in policy and administra-
tion (not necessarily financing however) is clearly not limited to
those with a conservative bias. Three recent reports: To Form a
More Perfect Union, National Conference on Social Welfare; One
Child in Four, American Public Welfare Association; and New
Choices in a Changing America, the Democratic Policy Commit-
tee, all called for varying degrees of devolution of federal
responsibility.
At a recent meeting of the National Association of Governors
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the complexity, if not the duplicity, involved became even more
apparent. Each level of government, naturally, would like to di-
rect the policy while requesting the other levels of government
to pay for it. The governors adopted a resolution which called
upon the federal government to accept the primary fiscal re-
sponsibility for financing income security programs (National
Governors Association, 1987). Specifically, the governors called
for the establishment of a national minimum level of assistance
which was to be fully federally funded. The governors also wanted
more federal participation in support programs geared to edu-
cation, training, job placement and job retention among present
and former AFDC recipients. Not surprisingly, the governors
also wanted more freedom in the design and structure of the
employment assistance programs. Simultaneously, the Admin-
istration prepared a legislative proposal which specifically re-
jected the concept of a federal minimum and went only part way
in giving states the freedom to design innovative approaches
(White House, 1987, pp. 2 & 4). The Public Assistance Subcom-
mittee cautiously suggested that beginning in 1993 state benefit
levels, adjusted by family size, be no less than 15% of state
median income. The House Ways and Means Committee full
report rejected even that modest standard (APWA, 1988A). Sen-
ator Moynihan and his 55 colleagues have sought to achieve all
of the high ground with proposals to improve interstate admin-
istration of child support enforcement, establish state designed
jobs training programs, increase federal financial participation
and require state review of their own payment standards (S1511,
July 21, 1987).
The various financing and administrative arrangements that
already exist in public assistance suggest that financing and
administration can be separated between levels of government.
That the financial, administrative, control and review proce-
dures can have an omnibus character is also clear. There is not
very much agreement about the programmatic, economic, or
political consequences of such separation. 4
II The Practice of Welfare/Federalism in AFDC Since 1960
In the 1960s the American federal system, and the American
categorical welfare system both entered a new policy phase and
a new stage of federal practice. Through a dramatic series of
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enactments the national government asserted an interest in a
range of public functions that had heretofore been in the prov-
ince, predominantly or exclusively, of state and local units.
Among the goals of the proponents of the nationalization of
welfare were: (a) more adequate benefits particularly for those
persons completely dependent on welfare payments and in-kind
transfers, and (b) the reduction the interstate variance in benefits
were seen as particularly central to the federal/state conflict. The
next section examines the progress, or lack thereof, that has oc-
curred with regard to each of these goals.
Adequacy
Changes in the level of average welfare benefits since 1960
are recorded in Table 1. Cash benefits when measured in con-
stant dollar terms were essentially flat in the early 1960's and
then rose significantly between 1964 and 1968. Between 1968
and 1985 cash welfare payments declined steadily, a function of
failing to raise benefits in response to the rise in the cost of
living. Benefits have been adjusted upwards but not nearly as
fast as the changes in cost of living. The average state decline
was 34.6% between 1968 and 1985. The national incorporation
of Food Stamps which occurred in 1972 provided a dramatic
increase in the total benefit package. 5 Since the food stamp ben-
efit is indexed and provides a floor of protection, the decline in
the total benefit has been, since 1972, just as steady but not so
steep as the dedine in the cash benefit.
Real family income has increased since 1960 corresponding
with a dramatic drop in the cash benefit as a share of median
family income (see col. 4 of Table 1). The incorporation of the
food stamp program muted this drop (see Col. 5 of Table 1).
Relative to median family income the drop is, none the less,
quite large. As measured against the poverty line, the total ben-
efit package has increased slightly over the 1960 level but is
down dramatically from its 1972 high. To the extent that the
adoption of the food stamp plan was a nationalization of welfare
it did make benefits more adequate in the short run. To the
extent that the states apparently began to rely on that national
floor, intergovernmental or federal financing has steadily
decreased.
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Table 1
Changes in the Mean AFDC and AFDC Plus Food Stamp Benefits in
1985 Dollars: Selected Years, 1960-1985
R AFDC AFDC Est. Nat. Col. 1 Col. 2 Benefit
Benefit Plus Median Income + +
YEAR Family of 3 Food Stamp Family of 3 Col. 3 Col. 3 Pov. Line
1960 6657 na 15,972 .416 na .606
1964 6577 na 18,039 .365 na .639
1968 7194 na 20,822 .345 na .798
1972 6940 8959 23,159 .300 .387 .818
1976 6419 8833 23,931 .257 .354 .807
1980 5327 7569 24,931 .208 .295 .689
1985 4704 7063 27,732 .169 .255 .642
InterState Equity
The declines and occasional increases of the national average
among the states does not, of course, depict what is occurring
in each state. Table 2 provides the significant detail to mark the
progress of benefits across the states over time. In constant dollar
terms, the state cash guarantee has fallen in 43 of the contiguous
states. Only in Vermont and Maine have cash benefits increased.
They have been essentially flat in Michigan, South Carolina and
Florida. After the correction for inflation, the median state de-
cline in cash benefits was 31.6%. Cash payment decline in terms
of the 1960 benefit is shown in col. 5 of table 2. This decline
was not related to the size of the benefit in 1960 [r< .10].
The inverse relationship between food stamp benefit and
AFDC benefit was deliberately structured to provide a national
minimum benefit. Food stamps are not counted in determining
eligibility for AFDC, but each dollar of face value of food stamps
reduces the cash received by 30 cents. Because of this interac-
tion, the state cash guarantee would have to rise $1.43 in order
to produce a $1.00 increase in total benefits. This process of
interactions, and presumably the knowledge of it, has contrib-
uted to the results recorded in col. 4 of Table 2. Total benefits in
1985 have increased most rapidly in the lowest paying states of
1960 and they have fallen in most of the high paying states
except California and Minnesota.
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Table 2
Changes in Benefit Level 1960-1965, by State
1 2 3 4 5
1960 1985 1985 Shift Change
Grant AFDC & AFDC Col. 2-Col. 1 Col. 3-Col. 1
in 1985 $'s Food Stamps only Col. 1 Col. 1
WA 10385 8604 6732 -0.171 -0.352 WA
NJ 10076 7657 5580 -0.240 -0.446 NJ
NY 9902 8753 6792 -0.116 -0.314 NY
WI 9860 9094 7632 -0.078 -0.226 WI
CT 9858 9329 7968 -0.054 -0.192 CT
MA 9601 7993 6060 -0.167 -0.369 MA
CA 9556 9614 8376 0.006 -0.123 CA
ID 9378 6641 4128 -0.292 -0.560 ID
MT 9119 7330 5112 -0.196 -0.439 MT
ND 8904 7565 5448 -0.150 -0.388 ND
MN 8813 8926 7392 0.013 -0.161 MN
OR 8552 8111 5616 -0.052 -0.343 OR
WY 8509 7270 4680 -0.174 -0.450 WY
IL 8422 6985 4620 -0.171 -0.451 IL
NM 8113 6380 3756 -0.214 -0.537 NM
OH 8026 6775 4320 -0.156 -0.462 OH
SD 8026 6868 4452 -0.144 -0.445 SD
KA 7957 7498 5352 -0.058 -0.327 KA
NH 7768 7464 5304 -0.039 -0.317 NH
IA 7550 7271 5028 -0.037 -0.334 IA
UT 7373 7421 5242 0.007 -0.289 UT
SC 7155 7742 5604 0.082 -0.217 SC
CO 7111 7279 5037 0.024 -0.292 CO
OK 9763 6683 4188 -0.012 -0.381 OK
MD 6588 7318 4740 0.111 -0.281 MD
PA 6458 7481 5328 0.158 -0.175 PA
VA 6458 7195 4920 0.114 -0.238 VA
MI 6106 8052 6144 0.319 0.006 MI
VT 6105 9220 7812 0.510 0.280 VT
AZ 5849 6102 3384 0.043 -0.421 AZ
NC 5804 6011 3228 0.036 -0.444 NC
NB 5674 7279 5040 0.283 -0.112 NB
KY 5449 5818 2952 0.068 -0.458 KY
MO 4802 6439 3840 0.341 -0.200 MO
IN 4799 6406 3792 0.335 -0.210 IN
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Table 2-Continued
Changes in Benefit Level 1960-1965, by State
1 2 3 4 5
1960 1985 1985 Shift Change
Grant AFDC & AFDC Col. 2-Col. 1 Col. 3-Col. 1
in 1985 $s Food Stamps only Col. 1 Col. 1
ME 4799 7657 5580 0.596 0.163 ME
WV 4799 6327 3744 0.318 -0.220 WV
GA 4755 5969 3168 0.255 -0.335 GA
LA 4712 5717 2808 0.213 -0.404 LA
NV 4625 6616 4092 0.430 -0.115 NV
DE 4320 6574 4032 0.522 -0.067 DE
TX 3836 5440 2412 0.418 -0.371 TX
TN 3492 5314 2232 0.522 -0.361 TN
FL 3401 6137 3408 0.804 0.002 FL
AR 5878 5633 2688 0.957 -0.066 AR
SC 5748 5674 2748 1.065 0.000 SC
AL 2399 4932 1764 1.056 -0.265 AL
MS 2182 4608 1440 1.112 -0.340 MS
In constant dollar terms real benefits have increased dra-
matically in the lower paying states. The 1985/1960 total benefits
ratios are shown in the vertical axis of Figure 1 while the benefits
in 1960 are plotted along its horizontal axis. The total benefit
change is principally a function of the level of state payment in
1960 [r=.862]. This results from the Food Stamp/AFDC formula
rather than action by each state in adjusting its own standards.
The vertical axis of Figure 2 is the 1985/1960 cash payment ratio.
This shows the shift in the payment standard set by the state
itself. This cash payment shift is not as strongly related to the
1960 standard [r=.478].
Table 3 provides aggregate information about the movements
around the concept of interstate equity. The interpretation of
these results become something of a federalism Rorschach. What
is clear, however, is that average cash benefits are down and the
states are no more equal. Those who advocated a nationalization
of welfare to promote adequacy and interstate equity appear to
have lost on both counts.
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Figure 1. Total benefit to total guarantee, 1985:1960*
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Figure 2. Ratio of guarantees only, 1985:1960*
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Table 3
InterState Equity: Income, AFDC, AFDC Plus Food Stamps 1960, 1972,
& 1985 (in 1985 Dollars)
1960 1972 1985
Per Capita Income
X 7472 10794 13032
Med. 7349 10789 13193
Sd. 1481 1488 1968
CV 20.00 13.8 15.1
Range 4371-10367 7872-13728 9187-18089
*I.Q.R. 6468- 8433 9555-11596 11243-14273
IQR - Med. .266 .189 .229
Income Guarantee From AFDC Benefit
X 6643 6929 4702
Med. 6748 6985 4710
Sd. 2276 2452 1637
CV 33.7 35.4 34.8
Range 2182-10385 1850-11826 1440-8376
IQR 4799- 8552 4687- 9066 3408-5580
IQR + Med. .556 .627 .461
Total Benefit (AFDC Plus Food Stamps)
X na 8949 7062
Med. na 8992 7017
Sd. na 1721 1174
CV na 19.2 16.6
Range na 5304-11894 4608-9614
IQR na 7384-10450 6137-7657
IQR + Med. na .341 .216
:IQR - Interquartile range.
There is a great deal of ancillary evidence in support of the
administration's thesis about the homogenization of the Amer-
ican states over the past 20 years. Clearly interstate highway
uniformities, the chain motels and restaurants have made this
homogenization apparent. Such surface appearance may not
correspond to the underlying reality. Using per capita income
and total state per capita taxes collected as objective indicators,
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Table 4
Coefficient of Variations, Various Welfare Indicators, 1960-1985
1 2 3
Per Total Tax Expenses
Capita Per $1000 Per Capita
Income Income own funds
on Welfare
1960 19.8 20.5 39.1
1964 18.3 25.1 36.9
1968 16.8 18.3 41.8
1972 13.8 18.1 41.2
1974 13.4 17.5 42.3
1976 12.3 15.6 40.5
1978 11.7 16.1 40.1
1980 12.9 15.7 37.6
1982 13.3 16.2 37.6
1984 13.4 20.0 39.7
1985 15.1 19.5 39.9
there is evidence that between 1960 and 1978 the states became
more alike. Since 1978 however, an unsteady move toward di-
versity has reasserted itself. Paradoxically, during the period of
homogenization the states became more diverse in their welfare
spending. Now that diversity is being reasserted the states have
come closer together in their pattern of welfare spending. Table 4
presents evidence of this paradoxical trend.
Table 5 presents data on the AFDC benefit and the combined
AFDC and Food Stamp benefit in 1985 as well as the AFDC
benefit in 1960 as a share of each state's estimated median family
income. The range, has been significantly reduced. Clearly, one
cannot know what the states would have done in the absence
of the national food stamp guarantee. The evidence, such as it
is, suggests that the states have moved to less adequate benefits
in relative terms. The interstate variations appear no less un-
equal. This last statement requires amplification. What has oc-
curred among state guarantees is that the state-shared cash
benefits have been reduced in both constant dollar terms and
relative to estimated mean family incomes. The standard devia-
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Table 5
Difference in Total & State Guarantees as a Ratio of Median
Family Income
1 2 3 4 5
1960 1985 Shift 1985 Change
AFDC AFDC & Col. 2-Col. 1 AFDC (Col. 4-Col. 1)
WA 0.559
NJ 0.470
NY 0.456
WI 0.572
CT 0.444
MA 0.493
CA 0.446
ID 0.640
MT 0.566
ND 0.656
MN 0.527
OR 0.483
WY 0.476
IL 0.402
NM 0.543
OH 0.433
SD 0.569
KA 0.465
NH 0.464
IA 0.480
UT 0.473
SC 0.407
CO 0.395
OK 0.459
MD 0.355
PA 0.364
VA 0.443
MI 0.332
VT 0.419
AZ 0.364
NC 0.470
NB 0.340
KY 0.437
MO 0.287
Food Stamps
0.284
0.204
0.250
0.317
0.237
0.224
0.274
0.274
0.306
0.288
0.291
0.295
0.244
0.217
0.268
0.235
0.282
0.250
0.229
0.265
0.324
0.256
0.225
0.250
0.211
0.256
0.227
0.272
0.349
0.219
0.237
0.251
0.247
0.223
Only
-0.275 0.223 -0.336
-0.266 0.149 -0.321
-0.206 0.194 -0.262
-0.255 0.266 -0.306
-0.207 0.202 -0.242
-0.239 0.170 -0.323
-0.172 0.170 -0.207
-0.366 0.170 -0.470
-0.260 0.214 -0.352
-0.368 0.207 -0.449
-0.236 0.241 -0.286
-0.188 0.204 -0.279
-0.232 0.162 -0.314
-0.185 0.144 -0.258
-0.275 0.158 -0.385
-0.198 0.150 -0.283
-0.287 0.183 -0.386
-0.215 0.178 -0.287
-0.235 0.163 -0.301
-0.215 0.183 -0.297
-0.149 0.229 -0.244
-0.151 0.185 -0.222
-0.170 0.156 -0.239
-0.209 0.157 -0.302
-0.144 0.137 -0.218
-0.151 0.185 -0.222
-0.216 0.155 -0.288
-0.060 0.207 -0.125
-0.070 0.296 -0.123
-0.145 0.121 -0.243
-0.233 0.127 -0.343
-0.089 0.174 -0.166
-0.190 0.125 -0.312
-0.064 0.133 -0.154
WA
NJ
NY
WI
CT
MA
CA
ID
MT
ND
MN
OR
WY
IL
NM
OH
SD
KA
NH
IA
UT
SC
CO
OK
MD
PA
VA
MI
VT
AZ
NC
NB
KY
MO
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Table 5-Continued
Difference in Total & State Guarantees as a Ratio of Median
Family Income
1 2 3 4 5
1960 1985 Shift 1985 Change
AFDC -AFDC & Col. 2-Col. 1 AFDC (Col. 4-Col. 1)
Food Stamps Only
IN 0.277 0.236 -0.041 0.140 -0.137 IN
ME 0.329 0.295 -0.035 0.215 -0.114 ME
WV 0.380 0.285 -0.095 0.168 -0.212 WV
GA 0.367 0.218 -0.149 0.116 -0.251 GA
LA 0.360 0.233 -0.127 0.114 -0.246 LA
NV 0.205 0.210 0.005 0.130 -0.075 NV
DE 0.198 0.211 0.013 0.130 -0.068 DE
TX 0.252 0.185 -0.067 0.082 -0.170 TX
TN 0.286 0.217 -0.069 0.091 -0.195 TN
FL 0.220 0.205 -0.015 0.114 -0.106 FL
AR 0.265 0.247 -0.018 0.018 -0.147 AR
SC 0.252 0.246 -0.006 0.119 -0.133 SC
AL 0.204 0.212 0.008 0.076 -0.128 AL
MS 0.229 0.230 0.001 0.072 -0.157 MS
tions have declined roughly proportionally to the means thus the
coefficients of variation have been static, while the range has
been reduced.
HR #1720, the House Ways and Means subcommittee bill,
called for a change in state standards which would have re-
quired, as a price of program participation, a state minimum
benefit of no less than 15% of that state's median family income
for a family of equal size. The subcommittee provision would
have reversed a drift that has been occurring over the past 25
years, as is shown in Table 6.
Consistency in State Practice
As shown in Table 7 in terms of relative state benefit sched-
ules the states have been remarkably consistent. Despite 25 years
of remarkable inter- and intrastate changes, the rank orders have
changed very little.
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Table 6
Number of States by Guarantee from State as a Share of Estimated
Median Income for a Family of the Same Size
<.15 >/.15 < .30 .30 < .45 .45
1950 0 11 38 19
1972 1 26 19 2
1980 10 35 3 0
1985 27 28 0 0
With Food Stamps Added
1972 0 0 3 45
1980 0 28 20 0
1985 0 44 4 0
Table 7
Total Benefit Levels 1960 & 1985
1960
1985 High Medium Low Total
High 5 2 0 7
Medium 2 29 2 33
Low 0 2 6 8
Total 7 33 8 48
Cell 1-Calif., Conn., Mass., N.Y., & Wisc.
Cell 2-Vermont & Minnesota
Cell 4-N.J. & Idaho
Cell 6-Delaware & Florida
Cell 8-Ky. & Louisiana
Cell 9-Alabama, Arizona, Miss., S.C., Tenn. & Texas
III Comment
It appears that there is now a desire to reshape the program
structure of AFDC. Both the House and Senate reform proposals
call for a major policy redesign. Clearly, if reform is achieved,
service, training and child support enforcement will be of equal
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importance to the income maintenance strategy. Consistent with
this thrust is a desire to give the states more discretion in the
design of their service/training programs. The widespread con-
ventional wisdom is that a national policy for service and train-
ing has not worked in this diverse land. The empirical evidence
to support that belief is not available. Even if we did know that
the centralized service strategy of the Great Society did not
work, it does not follow that a decentralized, or anti-federalist
plan would have worked. Paradoxically, we have not had a na-
tional child support policy but here the conventional wisdom is
that state discretion needs to be limited.
Regardless of the directions taken in service and child sup-
port policy, the problems of a partial retreat from national dom-
inance in benefit levels has been documented above. There is
every evidence to suggest that further reductions in national
government dominance in benefit schedules will result in the
political and social inequities which stimulated the drive to na-
tional dominance in the first instance. Interstate variation and
interstate rankings have been remarkably consistent.
For those who believe that poverty is a national problem,
generated in part by national and international economic cir-
cumstances, it follows that a national program is required. Their
opponents argue that only state and local fiscal and administra-
tive responsibilities will allow for the real diversity in beliefs
and conditions that need to be incorporated into effective wel-
fare programs. The recognition of the validity of both proposi-
tions demands a federal solution. A federal solution does not
mean national domination by the government in Washington.
Nor does it mean a retreat to the states. The ways in which the
various states have responded, and have failed to respond to
national government incentives is of critical importance in se-
lecting a federal solution. The fact that each level of government
in the federal system will resist being a fiscal (or ideological)
loser in any reshaped set of responsibilities may prove to be the
new "lion in the path" of welfare reform.
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Footnotes
1. In this paper the term federal refers to a program or concept which in-
volves both the national and the state governments, while national refers
to the government in Washington. State or state/local refers to action of
the indicated subordinate units. Thus OASDI' is a national program,
AFDC is a federal program, and general assistance is a state/local program.
2. Daniel J. Elazar provides particular useful discussions of the federalism
issues from a general perspective. See his The American System, (Chicago:
Rand-McNally, 1966) and The American Partnership (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1962). The modem classic on the general subject of
federalism remains, K. C. Wheare, Federalism (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1953. See also Jane Perry clark, The Rise of New Federalism
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1938).
3. A brief summary of the legislative story in early 1987 is found in The
New York Times, 4-12-87, Section 4#, p. 5.
To trace the political history of the reform effort new students to the
subject should read the story in its own sequence. A suggested order of
reading is as follows: D. P. Moynihan, The Politics of Guaranteed Income
(New York: Random House, 1965); Vincent and Vee Burke, Nixon's Good
Deed: Welfare Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Ken
Bowler, The Nixon Guaranteed Income Proposal: Substance and Process in
Policy Change (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974); Joseph Heffernan, "Welfare
Reform: A Political Farce in Three Acts" Inst. Research on Poverty, Disc.
Paper, 1973; L. E. Lynn and D. deF. Whitman, The President as Policy-
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maker: Jimmy Carter and Welfare Reform (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1981); W. P. Albrecht, "Welfare Reform: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come and Gone" in P. M. Sommers, Welfare Reform in America (Boston:
Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982).
4. A review of the econometric arguments is found in the following: Ed-
ward M. Gramikich, "An Econometric Examination of New Federalism,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Washington, The Brookings In-
stitution, (1982, p. 327-60); George F. Peterson, "Federalism and the States"
in Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record (Washington, Urban Institute,
1984), Davis, A. J. and S. Kenneth Howard. Perspective on a New Day
for Federalism" in Intergovernmental Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 2#, Spring
1982. Helen F. Ladd and Fred C. Doolittle, "Which Level of Government
Should Assist the Poor?" National Tax Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3#, pp. 323-
336. Albert Davis and Robert Lucke. "The Rich State-Poor State Problem
in a Federal System," Ibid., pp. 337-363.
5. The incorporation of the national medicaid program in the mid 60's pro-
vided a similar increase. Those figures are not structured into this account.
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Appendix
State Responsibility
For the Poor in 1934 and 1985
(1985 benefit as a ratio of median income)
1934
Programs Low Medium High Total
State with 4
Programs Calif.
For Aged, 0 12 States N.Y 16
Blind, and Minn.
Dependent Wisc.
Children
Age and 2
Dependent 0 6 States Mass. 8
Children Vermont
Only
Ages and 1
Blind 0 Utah 0
Only
Dependent 1
Children 5 13 States Conn. 19
Only
3
Alab. 1Tenn. GA
Texas

